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PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF MULTIPLE STATE TAXA-
TION OF INTANGIBLES OF NONRESIDENT
DECEDENTS SINCE THE ALDRICH CASE
The evils of multiple state taxation of intangibles owned
by nonresidents, following the Aldridk case in 1942,1 were
imaginatively described in the dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Jackson,' but today his remarks find little signifi-
cance in reality. Despite the anticipated greed of tax-hungry
states the problem has been somewhat mitigated by the
willing and cooperative attitude of the several states as
expressed in their immunity and reciprocity statutes." For
the purpose of immediate analysis, American jurisdictions 4
have been grouped in the following categories:
TABLE "A"
I. A. EXmPTION or immunity of ALL intangibles owned
by nonresidents:
(1) by repeal of prior statutes-N. Y., CONN.
(2) by Constitutional prohibition-DEL.
(3) by statute-Aruz., LA., MAss., Mo., Mnw.,
VT.
(4) by negative inference in the statutes taxing
tangible personalty-Ax., ME., N. J., TENN.,
VA.
1 316 U.S. 174, 62 S.Ct. 1008, 86 L.Ed. 1358, 139 A.L.R. 1436 (1942).
2 Mr. justice Jackson opined that only the state of domicile should be per-
mitted to tax intangibles, and pointed out five effects of multiple taxation:
(1) competitive exploitation, among the states, of intangibles as a source of death
duties and the subordination and deferment by the state of domicile to the taxing
power of the chartering state; (2) discrimination against intangibles win prejudice
its investment value by handicapping ownership; (3) expensiveness of ascertaining
taxes in chartering states; (4) domiciliary state will in effect be paying decedent's
taxes where there is a credit provision; and (5) competitive use by the states
will invite federal invasion of the death tax field.
3 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who wrote the majority opinion, stated that the
job of correcting the evils of multiple taxation would now be returned to "its
proper place of state control through uniform and reciprocal legislation, through
action by the states under the compact clause . . .or through whatever other
means statesmen may devise for distributing wisely the total national income for
governmental purposes between the states and the nation."
4 In this analysis, we shall include the forty-eight states, District of Columbia,
the territories of Hawaii and Alaska, the Philippine Islands, and Puerto Rico.
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B. EXEMPTION or immunity of ALL intangibles owned
by nonresidents who are residents of the United
States-WAsH., FLA.
C. EXEMPTION or immunity of CERTAIN intangibles
owned by nonresidents:
(1) over which no power of appointment ex-
ists-R. I.
(2) having no commercial or business situs in the
state-N. C.
(3) having no business situs in the state, if non-
resident is a resident of the United States-
D.C.
(4) stock of domestic corporation owned by resi-
dent of the United States--Ky.
II. A. RECIPROCAL EXEMPTION of ALL intangibles owned by
nonresidents--CALr., HAw., IDA., MD., MICH.,
N. H., N. M., OKLA., OHIO, ORE., PA., P. I., W. VA.,
WYo.
B. RECIPROCAL EXEMPTION of ALL intangibles owned by
only nonresidents who are residents of the United
States-ALAs., CoLO., MISS., MONT., NEBR., S. D.
C. RECIPROCAL EXEMPTION of ALL intangibles owned by
nonresidents, if the domiciliary state taxes such in-
tangibles-ILL., IND., S. C., KANS.
D. RECIPROCAL EXEMPTION of ALL intangibles owned by
only nonresidents who are residents of the United
States, if the domiciliary state taxes such intan-
gibles-IowA, UTAH, TEXAS, WIsc.
E. RECIPROCAL EXEMPTION of CERTAIN intangibles:
(1) stock of domestic corporation-N. D.
(2) having no business situs in state, except when
held in trust by local trustee for which no
domiciliary state taxes were paid-ALA.
(3) held in trust by local trustee for resident of
the United States-KY.
(4) owned by nonresident of the United States
only-FLA.
III. TAXATION of ALL intangibles owned by nonresidents, as
authorized by statute-GA., P. R.
IV. No DEATH TAXES WHATSOEVER-NEV.
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It can thus be observed that, out of the fifty-three Ameri-
can jurisdictions noted above, thirty-one.have enacted re-
ciprocal exemption statutes, while only nineteen have opti-
mistically rested upon exemption or immunity statutes, with-
out reciprocal features, to lessen the impact of multiple state
taxation.' Of the four most populated states (N. Y., Ill.,
Pa., and Calif.), only New York does not have a reciprocal
statute today." Success or failure of the measures taken to
avoid double taxation depends, in a most realistic sense,
upon the attitude of reciprocating states as to whether state
A, B, or C is "reciprocal" with them; ' and that fact, in
turn, is determined, in practice both by the favorable im-
munity accorded citizens of the reciprocating state and the
administrative assistance and co-operation given in collec-
tion of unpaid death taxes due the reciprocating state."
One of the earlier efforts toward reciprocity was the short-
lived movement initiated in 1903 by the enactment of a
Connecticut statute I remitting inheritance taxes on person-.
alty of nonresident decedents whose domiciliary state did
5 The states of Kentucky and Florida have statutes which have both re-
ciprocal and immunity features and are therefore described under both categories.
RFv. STAT. of Ky. § 140.275 (Baldwin, 1946) expressly declares the legislative
policy that "Kentucky shall not be a party to interstate double taxation." Ken-
tucky also taxes intangibles of nonresidents of the United States at the flat rate
of 5% even where the intangibles have no business situs in the State.
6 See N. Y. CoNsoL LAws § 148p Art. 10-C (McKinney, 1943), repealed by
§ 249mm, effective Sept. 1, 1930; also N. Y. CONsOL. LAws § 2 49p Art. 10-C
(McKinney, 1943), and N. Y. CoNSTruTO , art. XVI, § 3, effective Nov. 8, 1938.
7 For example, Colorado whose present reciprocal exemption statute was
enacted in 1943 lists itself as "reciprocal" with forty-two American jurisdictions
and cites nine jurisdictions as "nonreciprocal", i.e. Ala., D. C., Ga., Ky., Mass.,
N. C., P. R., R. I., and Wis. Colorado is also "reciprocal" with twenty juris-
dictions with respect to enforcement and collection of death taxes.
Maryland finds herself "reciprocal" with seven states; N. H. with twenty-
five; and Pa. with thirty-five. The factors determining "reciprocity" vary from
state to state, jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and no state has specifically cited its
reasoning for so granting or refusing to recognize reciprocity.
8 See, generally, Note, 43 HARv. L. Rav. 641-6 (1929). States sometimes
rationalize the basis for taxation on the ground of benefit and protection con-
ferred by them, and upon the fact of their actual power over or control of the
object taxed. See Aldrich case, supra, note 1.
9 Conn. Laws 1903, c. 63, § 2; Gallop's Appeal, 76 Conn. 617, 57 AtI. 699
(1904). See, Starr, Reciprocal and Retaliatory Legislation in the American States,
21 MsnN. L. Ray. 371, 393 (1936).
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not levy a similar tax upon estates of Connecticut decedents.
The next year West Virginia and Vermont exempted all
property of nonresident decedents without any demand for
reciprocal exemption.'" There followed Massachusetts in
1907," Kansas and Maine in 1909,2 and Minnesota in
1911,1" but the Minnesota statute was interpreted as creat-
ing no exemption in favor of residents of states which either
levied no inheritance tax at all, or levied no tax in like
circumstances. The result was an ineffective statute which
compelled states to re-enact taxation of intangibles of non-
residents with favored treatment to residents of reciprocat-
ing states in order to come within the provisions of such
reciprocal statutes. 4 Connecticut repealed her statute in
1907 substituting the retaliatory feature 11 applying only to
stock and registered bonds of domestic corporations held by
nonresident decedents of some eight nonreciprocating states
which were taxing Connecticut residents. West Virginia
likewise changed her reciprocal law to a retaliatory one,' 6
and by 1917 all the early statutes had been repealed.' The
failure of any organized group to support reciprocity with
vigor thus ended a fine effort at interstate cooperation.' 8
Between 1919 and 1923 North Dakota, Arizona, and Mon-
110 W. Va. Laws 1904, c. 6, § 6; Vt. Laws 1904, No. 30, §§ 3, 4.
11 Mass. Laws 1907, c. 563, § 3, re-enacted in 1909, c.490.4, § 3 and in 1911
c. 502, § 1. This statute, like the Kansas statute, created exemption between
reciprocating states and a state which exempted all estates of nonresidents from
inheritance taxation. Bliss v. Bliss, 221 Mass. 201, 109 N.E. 148 (1915).
12 KAw. GEN. STAT., § 9266 (Danssler, 1909). See State v. Davis, 88 Kan.
849, 129 Pac. 1197 (1913). Maine Laws 1909, c. 187, § 7.
14 Minn. Iaws 1911, c. 209, § 2(2). See State ex ref. Graff v. Probate Court,
128 Minn. 371, 150 N.W. 1094 (1915).
14 Op. cit., supra, note 8 at page 646.
15 Conn. Laws 1907, c. 179, §§ 1, 6. If the domiciliary state levied no tax at
all, or only on property physically within the state, Connecticut did not tax the
nonresident. See, The Reciprocal Feature of the Act Concerning Taxes On In-
heritances, Connecticut Public Document No. 48, Special No. 4 (Hartford 1908),
and the remarks of the then Tax Commissioner, W. H. Corbin. Also, 2 PRoc.
NATEONAL TAx Assoc. 171-194 (1908).
16 W. Va. Laws 1909, c. 63, § 6.
17 Kans. Laws 1913, c. 330, § 1; Maine Laws 1917, c. 266, § 2; Mass. Laws
1912, c. 678, § 2; Minn. Laws 1913, c. 565, § 1; Vt. Laws 1912, No. 60, § 3.
18 Starr, op. cit. supra, note 9, at p. 394.
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tana passed reciprocal laws 11 offering to exempt tangibles
located outside the state, if the state in which the property
was located similarly exempted their residents. But these
laws were rendered meaningless by the Frick case 2o in 1925,
which allowed only the state in which the tangibles had an
actual situs to tax. However, in December 1924, after
President Coolidge had publicly recommended correction of
abuses in state inheritance taxation,2' the Pennsylvania Tax
Commission sent out an invitation to commissioners of
neighboring states to meet with it at Harrisburg, Pa. Out
of the discussions arose a plan of reciprocity and the uncon-
ditional abandonment of taxation of intangibles of non-
resident decedents.22 Within six months the legislatures of
Pennsylvania, Connecticut, New York, and Massachusetts
enacted the recommendations into law.28 Two years later
eight additional states had adopted reciprocity, and in 1929
there were twenty-five states which had joined the move-
ment.24 Most of these statutes were adopted from the model
statutes of the National Tax Association and the National
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,25 but there were suf-
19 N. D. Laws 1919, c. 225, § 1 (1); also N. D. COMPL. LAWS Su P., § 2346
(1925); Mont. Laws 1923, c. 65, § 4 (4); Ariz. Laws 1921, c. 26, § 4 (7) and
ARIz. CODE § 3162 (1928).
20 268 U.S. 473, 45 S.Ct. 603, 69 L.Ed. 1058 (1925).
21 10 BuLL. N.T.A. 169-171 (1925).
22 20 PROC. N.T.A. 415-31 (1927).
23 Pa. Laws 1925, No. 381, § ld; Conn. Laws 1925, c. 239; N. Y. Laws
1925, c. 143; Mass. Laws 1925, c. 338. See, also, 10 BuLL. N.T.A. 265 (1925).
24 Ky. Laws 1926, c. 176, § 2; Calif. Laws 1927, c. 646; Ga. Laws 1929,
No. 331, § 5; Ill. Laws 1927, p. 748; Maine Laws 1927, c. 231; Md. Laws 1927,
c. 330; N. H. Laws 1927, c. 104; Ohio Laws 1927, p. 103; Ore. Laws 1927,
c. 118, § 1; Miss. Laws 1928, c. 191; Ark. Laws 1929, § 2; Idaho Laws 1929,
c. 243, § 8; Ind. Laws 1929, c. 65, § 4; Iowa Laws 1929, c. 203; S. C. Laws 1929,
No. 194; Texas Laws 1929 First Sess., c. 501; Wash. Laws 1929, c. 220; W. Va.
Law9 1929, c. 57; and Wyo. Laws 1929, c. 111.
25 "No tax shall be imposed in respect of personal property (except tangible
personal property having an actual situs in this state) if (a) the transferor at the
time of the transfer was a resident of a state or territory of the United States,
or of any foreign country which at the time of the transfer did not impose a
transfer tax or death tax of any character in respect of personal property of
residents in this State (except tangible personal property having an actual situs
in such state or foreign country) or, (b) if the laws of the state, territory or
country of residence of the transferor at the time of the transfer contained a
reciprocal exemption provision under which nonresidents were exempted from
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ficient variations and modifications in the legislative enact-
ments to produce uncertainties and litigation. The courts
nullified many statutes by looking at the administrative
practices of the states to see if reciprocity actually existed.26
Even the NTA which sponsored the reciprocal legislation on
intangibles lost hope and rejected it in favor of interstate
compacts in 1931 and 1935.27 Despite the ineffectiveness
of such statutes the zenith of the reciprocity movement was
reached in 1930 when thirty-seven states had reciprocal ex-
emption statutes.2" But in 1932, after the United States
Supreme Court had decided the First National Bank of Bos-
ton, the Baldwin, and the Farmers' Loan & Trust Company
cases,"° in which the concept of "single taxation" was re-
stored, the states no longer needed the shelter of reciprocity
for their residents; yet, only a few states bothered to repeal
these statutes! 8' The rule of immunity against "double
transfer taxes or death taxes of every character in respect of personal property
(except tangible personal property having an actual situs therein), provided the
state, territory, or country of resilence of such nonresident allowed a similar
exemption to residents of the state, territory, or country of residence of such
transferor. For the purposes of this section the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico,
and the possessions of the United States shall be considered territories of the
United States."
26 See, City Bank Farmers Trust Company v. New York Central Railroad,
253 N. Y. 49, 170 N. E. 489 (1930). Cf. Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the Aldrich
case, supra, note 1, at page 184: "But even if it were possible to make the needed
adjustments in the fiscal relations of the States to one another and to the
federal government through the process of episodic litigation-which to me seems
most ill-adopted for devising fiscal policies-it is enough that our Constitutional
system denies such a function to this court."
27 24 PRoc. N.T.A. 381, 393 (1931) and 28 PROC. N.T.A. 201-12 (1935).
28 23 PROC. N.T.A. 339 et seq. (1930).
29 First National Bank of Boston v. State of Maine, 284 U.S. 312, 52 S. Ct.
174, 76 L.Ed. 313, 77 A.L.R. 1401 (1932); Farmers Loan and Trust Company v.
State of Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204, 50 S.Ct. 98, 74 L.Ed. 371, 65 A.L.R. 1000
(1929); and Baldwin v. State of Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 50 S.Ct. 436, 74 L.Ed.
1056, 72 A.L.R. 1303 (1930). These cases, in effect, overruled the leading case of
multiple taxation, Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U.S. 189, 23 S.Ct. 277, 47 L.Ed. 439
(1903), wherein New York and Illinois were permitted to tax the debts owed by
New York debtors to an Illinois decedent. The Aldrich case truly reinstated the
Blackstone decision.
30 Note, Reciprocity in Nondomiciliary Inheritance Taxation of Intangibles,
26 IowA L. Rxv. 694, 699, 700 (1940). By the fifteenth of July, 1939, only Ala.
Mo., N. C., and Wash. had repealed these statutes. See Tweed & Sargent, Death
Taxes Are Certain-But, What of Domicile?, 53 HARv. L. Rzv. 68 (1939).
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taxation" was repeatedly rejected in subsequent cases, and
the Aldrich case in 1942,"' following on the heels of Illinois
Central Railroad Company v. State of Minnesota 2 and
Curry v. McCanless,"3 completely discarded the single taxa-
tion theory. Thus, the need for reciprocity and interstate
agreement is still pressing today. 4
There are at least thirty-five American jurisdictions today
which have both an inheritance tax and an additional estate
tax for purposes of credit under the federal estate tax law."
Six states have an inheritance tax only; seven, an estate
tax only; and three states have an estate tax for federal
81 Supra, Note 1.
32 309 U. S. 157, 60 S.Ct. 419, 84 L.Ed. 670 (1940).
33 307 U.S. 357, 59 S.Ct. 900, 83 L.Ed. 1339 (1940), which held that the Fifth
Amendment did not require a single exclusive place of taxation of intangibles for
the benefit of their foreign owner. There can be no question of the taxing power
of a state, for according to Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the Aldrich case, there are
but three limitations: (1) no state can without consent of Congress lay any imposts
or duties on exports or imports, except as necessary for executing its inspection laws,
Art. I, § 10, c. 2; (2) no state can without consent of Congress lay any tonnage
duties, Art. I, § 10, d. 3; and (3) by virtue of the Commerce Clause, no state can
tax as to discriminate against interstate commerce, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Cf. State of Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U. S. 435, 444; 61 S. Ct. 246,
85 L.Ed. 267, 130 A.L.R. 1229 (1940): "A State is free to pursue its own fiscal pol-
icies, unembarrassed by the Constitution, if by the practical operation of a tax the
State has exerted its power in relation to opportunities which it has given, to pro-
tection which it has afforded, to benefits which it has conferred by the fact of be-
ing an orderly civilized society."
Also, Graves v. Schmidlapp, 315 U. S. 657, 62 S.Ct. 870, 86 L.Ed. 1097 (1942);
In re Provident Trust Co. of Philadelphia, 346 Pa. 37, 42; 29 A. (2d) 524, 527
(1943) where Pennsylvania taxed the intangibles owned by a nonresident who was
a minor under the guardianship of a Pennsylvania resident who had legal title.
And, also, the Greenough case, 331 U.S. 486, 67 S.Ct. 1400, 91 L.Ed. 1274 (1947),
and 25 TAXEs MAG. 212, 214 (1946).
34 The June 29, 1942 issue of Barron's National Financial Weekly described
the Aldrich case as "the most confusing and shocking to estate owners within the
past decade." The fear that American trade would be "balkanized" was also ex-
pressed, Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390, 400; 62 S.Ct. 311, 86 L.Ed. 294
(1941). See Faught, Reciprocity in State Tazation as the Next Step in Empirical
Legislation, 92 U. or PA. L. R~v. 258, 263 (1934): "The signposts discernible in the
various opinions in the Aldrich case point in one direction. The unwholesome con-
flicts between the several States in competitive taxation may in time be diminished
or eliminated by such means as uniform or reciprocal legislation."
35 See TABLE "B". Florida, Georgia and Alabama are the states having estate
taxes for federal credit only. See Florida v. Mellon, 273 U. S. 12, 47 S. Ct. 265,
71 L.Ed. 511 (1927), holding that, although Florida imposed no inheritance taxes,
Florida could not restrain other states from collecting in Florida federal estate taxes.
Florida residents could get credit only for state taxes paid.
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credit only. Thirteen states have a gift tax in addition to
their death taxes. Perhaps Rhode Island has the greatest
variety, i.e., an estate tax, inheritance tax, gift tax, and es-
tate tax for federal credit. Only Nevada has no death taxes
whatsoever.36 Thus, the wide prevalence of transfer and
death taxes among the several states focuses the problem "
of alleviating the appetites of such tax-hungry jurisdictions.
Reciprocal exemption statutes take various forms. The
most satisfactory is the Uniform Reciprocal Transfer Tax
Act, which is the current law of only fourteen states. 8 Re-
ciprocal exemption is granted if the other state: (a) does
not impose a tax, or (b) has a reciprocal statute. Inclusion
of both provisions in a statute makes for greater uniformity;
yet Indiana and Illinois 19 have adopted only (b), i.e., re-
ciprocal exemption for nonresidents only if the domiciliary
state taxes such intangibles. Alabama, California, Missouri,
Kentucky, New York, and Washington have either repealed
or omitted to re-enact the Uniform Act,40 and South Dakota
36 Nevada repealed an inheritance tax statute, effective July 1, 1925. Only
after November 3, 1942, are death taxes specifically prohibited by § 1, Article X
of the Nevada Constitution.
37 See, generally, Tweed & Sargent, supra note 30. The estimated state col-
lections for death and gift taxes in 1943 were $100,000,000, in contrast to $112,000,-
000 in 1942 before the Aldrich case. In 1945 collections exceeded $131,000,000.
C.C.H. TAx SYsTEMs OF THE WORLD (10th Ed.), 314.
38 Alaska Laws 1933, c. 93, § 3111; HAWAII REV. LAWS, c. 103, § 5561 (1945);
IDAHO CODE, § 14-401 to -428 (Bobbs-Merrill, 1932); ni1. Laws (1909), p. 311;
Ind. Laws, 1931, c. 75, § 27; Ill. Laws (1909), p. 311. South Carolina and Kansas
similarly interpret their statutes, although it is not the Uniform Act, supra, note
38, and KANs. GEN. STAT., c. 75, § 79-150le (1935), amended c. 369, Laws of 1941.
39 Ind. Laws 1931, c. 75 § 27; Ill. Laws 1909, p. 311.
40 In Alabama the Uniform Act-Ala. Laws 1932 Sp. Sess., § 7(12) of
Act 59,-was omitted in Ala. Laws 1935, Act 194. Alabama today grants recip-
rocal exemption only of intangibles which have not gained a business situs, except
for intangibles held in trust with Alabama trustee for which no domiciliary State
tax has been paid. ALA. CODE, § 438(1) (1940).
In California the Uniform Act was repealed but the current law, CALIF. STATS.,
c. 658, § 1 (1943), is substantially similar language. See also: Estate of H. P.
Dargie, 48 Cal. App. (2d) 101, 119 P. (2d) 438 (1941).
In Missouri the Uniform Act, Mo. R. S. § 576 (1929), was repealed by Laws
1939, § 574, p. 182. Laws 1941, p.281, did not re-enact the repealed statute, but
amended § 571 exempting all intangibles.
In New York the Uniform Act was repealed. See N. Y. CoNsoL. LAws,
§ 249mm (McKinney, 1943), effective Sept. 1, 1930. See supra note 6.
In Kentucky the Uniform Act was last repealed before 1939; see supra note 30.
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is the most recent state to have adopted the Act.4 The
statutes of five other states, however, closely follows the
language of the Uniform Act.42  Thus, at least twenty-two
out of thirty-one jurisdictions having reciprocal exemption
statutes find most of their statutory language in the Act.
But this uniformity is hardly true, for modifications and
additions to the language, court decisions by uninformed
judges, and administrative rulings by politically-appointed
commissioners have made at least eight distinctions in types
of categories among the reciprocal exemption statutes.43
This difficulty has been well described:
The resultant confusion points to a caveat for reciprocal
legislation: variation in terminology means doubt as to the
existence of reciprocity between two States. It is difficult to
see how States requiring an unconditional exemption of their
own residents fit into the scheme with other States, or indeed
with one another. Furthermore, every State which attempts
to grant reciprocity is confronted with a miscellaneous group
of statutes which fit no classification. Variant judicial and
administrative rulings as to what constitutes tangible and in-
tangible property make it chaotically uncertain whether one
State, in spite of its statute, is entitled to reciprocity with
41 S.B. 59, Laws of 1945, effective July 1, 1945.
42 Colo. Laws 1943, c. 116, § 6(b) (3); Miss. CODE OF 1942, Title 36, c. 2,
§ 9269-Mississippi curiously enough, after the Aldrich case, gave public notice
of its intention to continue ta adhere to the theory of single taxation expressed
in the First National Bank of Boston case, supra note 29, and LT. of State Tax
Commission (Sept. 11, 1942); Mont. Laws of 1945, H.B. 22-Montana indicated
that the Aldrich case had restored § 10400.11, REVISED CoDES oil MONTANA (1935),
to full effectiveness! N. H. REvIsED LAWS 1942, c. 89, § 29; O-io GENERAL CODE,
J 5334-1 (Page, 1945). The language of the Ohio statute resembles Part (b) of
the Uniform Act, but Ohio courts have added (a) by interpretation, and the
statute is in all respects the entire Uniform Act. See RULIMo or TUE TAX Com-
nssior op Omzo, July 7, 1939.
Five other states have statutes which prescribe "like exemptions", the vague-
ness of which has only added to the confusion: Utah Laws 1943, c. 89, § 80-12-9;
Wisc. STAT., c. 72, § 72.01 (9) (1947); Okla. Laws of 1945, c. 22, § 989e; ORE.
Coi snr.. LAws AN ., Title 20, § 20-104 (Bancroft-Whitney, 1940); and N. M.
STAT. ANN., § 34-104 (Bobbs-Merrill, 1941).
43 See TABLE "A". The Philippine Islands, though allowing reciprocal
exemption subjected to taxation the stock in a Philippine partnership owned by
a resident of California held for her in the Philippines by a native trustee who
had complete powers thereover, Wells Fargo Bank & Trust Co. v. Collector,
P. I. Supreme Court, June 28, 1940; cert. den. 312 U. S. 700, 61 S.Ct. 741, 85
L.Ed. 1134 (1941).
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another. The reciprocal relation is a myth to the extent that
uniform words are given varying meanings.44
Another category of statutes which seek to cast off the
burden of multiple taxation are the exemption or immunity
statutes without reciprocal features. This is perhaps the
more genuine and sincere effort, and thirteen states " which
exempt all intangibles of nonresidents have individually de-
cided that "a State gains more by stimulating the business
of its banks, trust companies, and brokers than it would
gain by attempting to tax intangibles of nonresidents held
in the State on deposit, in custody, or in trust." " These
states seem satisfied with the benefits of reciprocity and
are not saddened by the seeming loss of revenue. In Dela-
ware the exemption provisions were embodied as a consti-
tutional prohibition 4 to facilitate the transfer of stock under
44 Note, Reciprocal and Retaliatory Tax Statutes, 43 HARV. L. REy. 641,
643 (1929). Two other interesting problems concern the effective date of the
reciprocal exemption statutes and the international aspect of reciprocity: (1) In
the absence of a specific provision to the contrary, reciprocal statutes operate
prospectively and not retroactively. See Fisher v. Bruckner, 41 F. (2d) 774 (D. C.
Mich. 1930), but note that California's then enacting statute of July 29, 1927,
granted reciprocity to residents of Iowa from July 4, 1927, the effective date of
the Iowa statute. Cf. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., supra, note 26, and Com-
mission v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 297 Pa. 335, 147 A. 71 (1929). Also, the
effective dates of a state listed as "reciprocal" may vary from its actual effective
date when cited by the reciprocating state! (2) Many states such as Pennsyl-
vania and New Hampshire have reciprocity agreements with such foreign countries
as the Kingdom of Denmark and the Canadian provinces, respectively. But, in
general, there is nothing, except a treaty between the United States and the
foreign government (See Nielson v. Johnson, 279 U. S. 47, 49 S.Ct. 223, 73
L.Ed. 607 (1929)) to prevent a state from imposing a greater tax upon property
passing to nonresident aliens. Petersen v. State, 245 U. S. 170, 38 S.Ct. 109,
62 L.Ed. 225 (1917), Frederickson v. State, 63 U. S. 445, 16 L.Ed. 376 (1859).
45 Ark. Laws 1941, Art. 136; Aaxz. CODE ANN., c. 40 (1939); Conn. Laws
1937, c. 19, § 1; DEL. REv. CODE, Art. 10, c. 6, § 101 (1936); La. Laws 1940,
Act 67; MAiNa REV. STAT., c. 142, § 21 (1944); Mnw. STAT., § 291.01 (1) (4)
(1945); Mo. REV. STAT., § 571 (1939); N. J. REv. STAT., 54:34-1 (1937); N. Y.
CONSOL. LAWS, c. 60, Art. 10-C, § 249p (McKinney, 1943); TENN. CoDE, Art. X,
c. 1, § 1259 (1b) (1932) Vt. Laws 1896, C. 45, § 1048; and Va. Tax Code,
c. 9, § 120 (1) (1936).
46 See Tweed & Sargent, supra, note 30. It would be a denial of due process
for the legislature to attempt to revoke an exemption granted in respect to past
exemption: Untermeyer v. Anderson, 276 U. S. 440, 48 S.Ct. 353, 72 L.Ed. 645
(1928).
47 Art. IX, § 6 of the DErAWaRE CoNsTrruTioN, 22 Del. Laws, c. 254; also,
D L. REv. COD, c. 6, Art. 10 (1936).
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the liberal corporation laws of that state. Other methods of
exemption are by express statute,4" by repeal of existing
statute4 " and without a statute, by negative inference."
But still variations occur, for at least six states exempt only
certain intangibles." In particular, the District of Columbia,
Kentucky, and Rhode Island have been cited as "non-
reciprocal" with other states.2 Wisconsin, having a re-
ciprocal exemption statute, has found New York's exemp-
tion statute "fully reciprocal," however; and therefore
assessed no inheritance tax on the transfer of personalty on
the death of a New York decedent.5 Even Washington,
whose statute exempts only intangibles owned by residents
of the United States, was held "reciprocal" with Idaho
under the Idaho reciprocal exemption statute." Though New
York regards itself as "reciprocal" with all other states by ex-
empting all intangibles, too many states with reciprocal
exemption statutes do not accord New York the same privi-
lege. Exemption statutes, ipso facto, do not provide full
protection, unless uniformly adopted without qualification.
48 ARiz. CODE ANN., c. 40 (1939); La. Laws 1940, Act 67, but an Op. Arr.
GEN. dated Nov. 20, 1946, advocated taxing the bank account of a deceased
Mexican if over $2000, and if he owned Louisiana real estate; Mnr. STAT.
§ 291.01 (1) (4) (1945); Mo. R!v. STAT., §. 571 (1939;); Vt. Laws 1896, c. 46,
§ 1048. Massachusetts does exempt intangibles under the inheritance tax law (Gen.
Laws of 1932, c. 65, § 1), but under the additional estate tax for federal credit,
intangibles of nonresidents of the United States are taxable.
49 Connecticut and New York.
50 The Va., Ark., Tenn., Maine, and N. J. statutes expressly tax realty and
tangible personal property, omitting all reference to intangibles.
51 See TABLE "A". After the Aldrich case it is doubtful if these statutes
exempting only certain intangibles can secure to their residents the benefit of
reciprocal exemption. Rhode Island (Ltr. of Div. of Taxation, Aug. 10, 1942)
declared that no change was contemplated after the Aldrich case unless retalia-
tory legislation becomes necessary.
52 Supra, note 9. Pennsylvania and New Hampshire also regard these states
as "nonreciprocal" but Maryland says "reciprocity" may exist with the District
of Columbia. It is thus doubtful if these statutes solve anything.
53 Estate of Uihlein, 247 Wisc. 476, 20 N.W. (2d) 120 (1945), discussed in
Wisconsin L. R. 139 (1946). See also, Estate of Rohnert, 244 Wisc. 404, 12
N.W. (2d) 684 (1944).
54 McNaughton v. Newport, 170 P. (2d) 601 (1946). Cf. Estate of Eiler-
mann, 179 Wash. 15, 35 P. (2d) 763 (1934) where Washington and New Jersey
were involved.
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Only two American jurisdictions have statutes which
authorize taxation of intangibles without reference to reci-
procity or exemption.55 But the Georgia decisions 56 show
the reluctance, and perhaps fear, that failure to grant ex-
emptions or accord reciprocity will make Georgia residents
and decedents the target of transfer and death taxes every-
where! There is insufficient data on Puerto Rico to under-
stand its attitude properly.
Whether a jurisdiction has reciprocal exemption or ex-
emption statutes, there have been in the last fifteen years
statutes passed in twenty-two states " providing for recip-
rocal enforcement and collection of transfer and death taxes
and supplementing the basic statutes. These reciprocal en-
forcement statutes take two forms: (1) where nonresident
estate is being administered in local probate courts, the tax
authorities of the domiciliary state are notified of the filing
of letters testamentary or of administration, and such taxes
are to be paid before final accounting is approved, if both
states are on a reciprocal basis; and (2) where local courts
are empowered to entertain suits, on a reciprocal basis, by
taxing officials of the domiciliary state to collect unpaid
taxes without need for bringing suit upon judgment already
obtained.58 Under the latter form, there is no provision for
55 GA. CODE, Part X, c. 92034 (1946), effective Mar. 26, 1941; P. R. Laws
1946, Act No. 303.
50 In National Mortgage Corporation v. Suttles, 194 Ga. 772, 22 S.E. (2d)
386, 389 (1942), a promissory note of a Georgia resident owned by a nonresident
and held outside the state was not taxed; "These decisions imply it is the intent
and policy of our State constitution that Georgia's jurisdiction to tax is limited
territorially to Georgia, and that it cannot reach out into the bounds of other
states. According to these decisions, there must be a tax situs in Georgia and
the mere residence of the debtor does not establish such a situs." The Aldrich
case has been expressly distinguished in Georgia as involving "succession and not
ad valorem taxes." See Davis v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 194 Ga. 772,
26 S.E. (2d) 618, 624 (1943), and Davis v. Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co.,
198 Ga. 558, 32 S.E. (2d) 180, 194 (1944).
57 Alabama, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Kentucky, Maine,
Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Virginia, and Wisconsin.
58 See, generally, C.C.H. INHERirANCE, EsTrxr AND GiFr TAX SERVICE, Re-
ciprocal Enforcement of Domiciliary Inheritance Taxation in Nonresident Estates,
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giving of notice other than by suit, and only four states 9
use this procedure in their statutes. In either case such re-
ciprocal enforcement statutes extricate nonresident dece-
dents from the problem of the Massachusetts v. Missouri
case 6 which denied that any contract right was conferred
upon Massachusetts as the beneficiary state by the enact-
ment of a reciprocal exemption statute in Missouri to en-
force Missouri's statute in favor of a Massachusetts resi-
dent who died in Missouri. The Supreme Court relegated
the parties to the Missouri courts or the federal district
court in Missouri. In reality, therefore, the effectiveness of
such enforcement statutes similarly depends upon a recipro-
cating state looking upon another state as "reciprocal" with
it, perhaps when the other state gives reasonable assurance
§§ 12,030 and 2290. Connecticut which exempts all intangibles has only an "estate
tax" of penalties when taxes are overdue for five years!
59 Ala. Laws 1947, House Bill 184, effective Oct. 9, 1947; Miss. Laws 1934,
c. 130, effective March 6, 1934; Ore. Laws, c. 103 and c. 387, effective June 11,
1935, with amendment July 5, 1947, respectively 1935, 1947; Wisc. Laws 1947,
c. 409.
The majority of States follow the former form: CAiF. PoTL CoDE, § 3671e
(Deering, -1937), effective Aug. 27, 1937; Colo. Laws 1941, H.B. 399, effective
Apr. 19, 1941; Conn. Laws 1933, c. 75, effective Apr. 4, 1933; Del. Laws 1939,
c. 138, effective Apr. 14, 1939; Ky. Laws 1936, 3rd Spec. Sess., c. 8, effective
Apr. 24, 1936; Maine Laws 1933, c. 147, effective June 30, 1933; MD. ANN. CoDE,
§ 140 (1939), effective Apr. 4, 1936; Mich. Public Acts 1937, Act. 76, effective
Oct. 27, 1937; Mass. Laws 1933, c. 319, effective Oct. 6, 1933; N. H. Laws 1933,
c. 77, effective Apr. 18, 1933; N. J. Laws 1932, c. 49, effective Apr. 6, 1932;
N. Y. Laws 1932, c. 333, effective Mar. 21, 1932; N. C. Laws 1935, c. 371, effec-
tive June 10, 1935; Ohio Laws 1933, vol. 115, p. 69 Sp. Sess., effective Sept. 22,
1933; Okla. Laws 1939, c. 66, effective Apr. 10, 1939; Pa. Laws 1933, Act 147,
effective Sept. 1, 1933; R. I. Laws 1932, c. 1963, effective Apr. 21, 1932; and
Va. Laws, 1932, c. 194, effective June 20, 1932.
The New York statute is typical of the majority and applies only to states
which have passed a similar act, and to states which do not grant letters in
estates of decedents until after letters have been issued by the state of domicile.
Every petition of nonresident decedents for original letters testamentary or of
administration must cite the Tax Commission which shall notify authorities of
domiciliary state of the fact of filing, of the property and valuation thereof.
No final accounting can be had until proof of all death taxes due domiciliary
State are paid.
60 308 U. S. 1, 60 S.Ct. 39, 84 L.Ed. 3 (1939). Cf. State ex rel. Oklahoma
Tax Commission v. Rodgers, 193 S.W. (2d) 919, 165 A.L.R. 785 (1946).
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of assistance in the collection of unpaid taxes. Only a truly
uniform statute which the courts and administrative officials
seek to apply uniformly will insure effective relief.
States have also adopted precautionary measures to safe-
guard their taxing rights where the other state is "non-
reciprocating". The consent of some state official is usually
required to transfer stock of a domestic corporation owned
by a nonresident decedent. Approximately sixty per cent of
American jurisdictions require a waiver before transfer,6'
except perhaps for stock of a foreign corporation. Colorado
requires a waiver if the aggregate value of securities held
by a nonresident decedent in any one corporation exceeds
$300.62 Louisiana requires a waiver for stock customarily
held in the state or present there at death.6" Nebraska has
no waiver but makes the corporation liable for unpaid taxes
on stock owned by nonresidents at death,64 while Pennsyl-
vania and Wisconsin require a waiver, except where the
stock was jointly held by husband and wife.65
Somewhat in recognition of the necessity for forbearance
on the part of tax-hungry states and of the fact that federal
courts customarily decline jurisdiction where two states have
determined domicile of a decedent differently 66 provisions
for compromise and arbitration have been inserted in recip-
rocal exemption and exemption statutes. Eleven states so
provide, five of which allow for both compromise and arbi-
61 Inheritance Tax Waivers, C.C.H. INHERITANCE, ESTATE, AND GIFT TAX
SEavxcE, §§ 13,200 and 2310. Curiously, Florida has no waiver requirement, but
requires aliens to pay one dollar to obtain it!
62 CoLD. STAT. ANN., c. 85 (1935).
63 La. S.S. Laws, 121, Act. 127.
64 NEBR. R.EV. STAT., c. 77 (1943).
65 Pa. Laws (1933), Act 147, and Wis. STAT., C. 72 (1947).
66 Massachusetts v. Missouri, supra, note 60. Cf. Worcester Co. Tr. Co. v.
Riley, 302 U. S. 292, 58 S. Ct. 185, 82 L.Ed. 268 (1937); Colorado v. Harbeck,
232 N. Y. 71, 133 N.E. 357 (1921), and Matter of Martin, 255 N. Y. 359, 173
N.E. 878 (1931).
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tration,e7 while the others recognize compromise only."
Maryland and Vermont are the only jurisdictions to have
adopted the Uniform Act of Interstate Arbitration of Death
Taxes, and the Uniform Act of Interstate Compromise of
Death Taxes, which provide for action by the Tax Com-
missioner or State Controller with the approval of the At-
torney General.69 In California a state court must approve
the compromise agreement,10 while in New Hampshire the
Assistant Attorney General is empowered alone to effect the
compromise. 7 New York, New Jersey, and Massachusetts
invest full authority in the Tax Commissioner or the Direc-
tor of the Division of Taxation.72 Connecticut requires ap-
proval of both the Governor and the Attorney General "-
and there are many more wide variations. The Uniform
Acts make it unnecessary, however, for a beneficiary or
donee to intervene in proceedings of compromise or arbitra-
tion; the responsibility is placed on the administrator or
executor to whom the tax authorities look for payment of
the tax. The sound view of the Act should be uniformly
adopted; rebates and special favored treatment then have
less opportunity to prevail.
II
In addition to these statutory modes of reciprocity and
exemption, many other suggestions for easing the burden
67 Conn. Laws 1947, c. 426; Del. Laws 1941, c. 5; MD. AwN. CODE,
§ 140A-140M, and § 140N-140Q (1939); Mass. Gen. Laws 1932, c. 65B, effective
June 4, 1943; Vt. Public Acts 1947, Acts 22 and 23.
68 CATar. REvENUE A"r TAxATION CODE, § 14191, 14192; D. C. in STAT.
(1937), c. 690, Art. III, § 16; N. H. RPv. LAws, c. 87, § 65 (1942); N. J. R. S.
Title 54, c. 38A (1937); N. Y. CoNsor. LAws, Art. 10-C, c. 60, § 2490, (McKinney,
1943); and Pa. Laws 1919, Act. 258, § 43.
69 Supra, note 68.
70 Ibid., note 68.
71 Ibid., note 68.
72 Ibid., note 68.
73 Ibid., note 68.
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of multiple taxation have been heard. Interstate compacts
under Article I, Section 10, Clause 3 of the Constitution of
the United States would bind the states concerned into an
enforceable agreement but would require congressional
consent to become operative.7" To effect any change in the
language of the compact would require the consent again
of both states and the approval of Congress. Such procedure
hardly commends itself to administrative efficiency, though
Congress could pass a general enabling act consenting in
advance to such compacts and subsequent changes. 71 Only
one example of an interstate compact affecting tax conflicts
had been found before 1925,76 and this agreement between
Kansas and Missouri required a joint resolution of Con-
gress.77 Other administrative difficulties make compacts im-
practical. 8
74 See, generally, Clark, Interstate Compacts and Social Legislation, 50 PoL.
Sci. Q. 502, 507 (1935).
76 Clark, op. cit., supra, note 74, at page 520, commenting upon the enthu-
siasm for the idea of blanket consent at the Second Interstate Assembly in 1935,
and citing 8 STATE GOVEPNMM 102 (Apr. 1935, No. 4).
76 Kansas City Waterworks Agreement of 1922 effected cooperation in the
regulation and immunity from taxation by either state of waterworks situated
in both states. The compact was ratified by Kansas in 1921 (Kans. Laws 1921,
c. 304, p. 471) and by Missouri in the same year. (Mo- HousE J. 1258 (1921)
and Mo. SEaaTE J. 932 (1921). On the 22nd of September 1922, consent was
given by Congress in proper fashion, State v. Joslin, 116 Kans. 615, 227 Pac. 543
(1924), commented on in 19 ILL. L. R. 479.
77 42 STAT. 1058, 67th Cong., Seas. II (1922). States can give their con-
sent to a compact by (1) joint resolution of state Legislature, State ex rel.
Baird v. Joslin, supra, note 76; (2) statutory offer by one state and acceptance
by another, C & 0 Canal Co. v. B & 0 Railroad Co., 4 G. & J. (Md.) 1 (1835);
or, (3) parallel legislation incorporating agreement previously drafted by repre-
sentatives of states who are parties to the compact.
Although congressional consent is necessary, an interstate agreement between
Louisiana and Arkansas in 1886 was upheld without such consent in Fisher v.
Steele, 39 La. Ann. 447, 1 So. 882 (1887). Louisiana had promised certain state
taxes to be placed to the credit of certain levee districts "to be used . . . in con-
structing, repairing, and maintaining any and all levees in State of Arkansas
(said State consenting) that will protect said district from overflow." La. Acts
1886, No. 79, 120. For a most thorough discussion of the subject generally, see
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Another suggestion would provide for grants-in-aid by the
Federal Government to states which abolished death taxes."
In effect, the Federal Government would collect higher taxes
and share with the states on the basis of such factors as
population, wealth, total collections within a state or area,
etc., etc. The same authors 80 advocate, in the alternative,
amending the federal estate tax law to grant eighty per cent
state tax credit to those estates of taxpayers in states impos-
ing death taxes on intangibles in accord with uniform fed-
eral stipulations. The merits of these proposals should at-
tract attention, but the first step might be a nationwide
survey in preparation of a congressional statute.81
Justice Jackson in his dissenting opinion in the Aldrich
case 82 suggested federal incorporation to avoid the possi-
bility of a corporation being held a domestic corporation in
more than one state. The federal corporate charter would
fix one state as the domiciliary state for all purposes includ-
ing taxation in the same fashion as has been done in the
case of national banks." But federal incorporation would
Frankfurter and Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A Study in
Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALx L. J. 685, 704, 747, 753 (19"25). For early case,
see Gibbons v. Ogden, 8 Wheat. 1, 5 L.Ed. 547 (1823), and Virginia v. Tennessee,
148 U. S. 503, 517; 13 S. Ct. 728, 37 L. Ed. 537 (1893); also, Notes in 35 Cor.
L. REv. 76; 31 HARV. L. REv. 321; and 21 MN. L. REv. 371.
78 Cf. Clark v. Allen, 331 U. S. 503, 517; 67 S.Ct. 1431, 91 L.Ed. 1285
(1947), upholding a California statute making the right of nonresident aliens to
acquire property depend upon the reciprocal rights of American citizens in those
countries. Perhaps the Supreme Court implied congressional consent to such a
compact as being unnecessary l
79 Hellerstein & Hennefeld, State Taxation in a National Economy, 54 HAv.
L. REv. 949, 973-5 (1941).
80 Supra, note 79, at page 971.
81 See, Gwin, White and Prince case, 305 U. S. 434, 449; 59 S.Ct. 325, 329;
83 L.Ed. 272 (1939) and McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 390 U. S. 176, 183,
186; 60 S.Ct. 504, 510; 84 L.Ed. 683 (1940).
82 316 U. S. 174, 62 S.Ct. 1008, 86 L.Ed. 1358 (1942).
83 Rxv. STAT. § 5219, as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 548 (1946). Tappan v. Mer-
chants National Bank, 19 Wall. 490 (1873) ; In re Cushing's Estate, 40 Misc. 505,
82 N.Y.S. 795 (1903). Cf. Re Sherwood's Estate, 122 Wash 648, 211 Pac. 734
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deprive the states of badly needed revenue for the operation
of state governments.
Interstate cooperation in the form of a uniform flat-rate
tax on all intangibles of nonresidents was actually adopted
in five states before the New York flat-rate tax statute was
held unconstitutional as violating both the equal protection
and immunities clauses of the Federal Constitution.84
A former New York tax law 85 repealed in 1940 had
allowed credits by domiciliary states for taxes paid to other
states. But the enforcement of this provision was nullified
by the practices of administrators and executors who there-
by escaped payment of such taxes.
III
It is submitted that of the many suggestions advanced to
protect against multiple taxation, uniform reciprocal exemp-
tion statutes, which will eventually become exemption stat-
utes when all fifty-three American jurisdictions have com-
plied with its purposes, offer the most helpful solution. The
courts must assume the offensive in this drive for uni-
formity 8 and aid the process by interpreting and constru-
(1922), holding that 12 U.S.C. § 548 had no application to the Washington inherit-
ance tax, and therefore states other than where a national bank is located could
impose a tax on such shares of stock. See also, 36 STAT. 1902, 28 U.S.C. § 41 (16)
(1946).
84 Smith v. Loughran, 245 N. Y. 486, 157 N.E. 753 (1927). The flat-rate
plan was perhaps first sponsored by former Attorney General Matthews of New
Hampshire (N. H. Laws 1921, c. 70, p. 75) and adopted by Connecticut, Cali-
fornia, Kentucky, New York, and Virginia before 1927. See, 14 A.BA.J. 309
(1928).
85 N. Y. CONSOL. LAWS, § 2490, Art. 10-C (McKinney, 1943), was repealed
by N. Y. Laws 1940, c. 138. In the Aldrich case the New York statute had
allowed as credit the amount of any constitutionally valid estate or inheritance
tax paid to any other state within three years after the New York decedent's
death.
86 Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the Aldrich case: "More basically, even though
we believed that a different system should be designed to protect against multiple
taxation, it is not our province to provide it." Cf. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v.
State, 348 Mo. 725, 155 S.W, (2d) 107 (1941).
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ing such uniform statutes to effectuate their general pur-
pose, i.e., to make uniform the laws of those states enacting
the statute.87 Such encouragement will push states to re-
gard all others as "reciprocal" with them and settle in a
desirable manner the many perplexing problems about the
nature of the property transferred 88 and any question of
domicile.
Warren Freedman
87 9 UNI:FoPm LAws ANN. 619 (1944).
88 At least two perplexing questions present themselves: If decedent made
a transfer in contemplation of death of intangibles taxable in state other than doml-
cile and transferee substitutes other property for that received, how will other
state collect tax? Or, if transfer is in trust, will the right of states, other than
those of decedent's and trustee's domiciles, to tax depend upon the nature of the
property if the trust is not subject to any further action on the part of the
transferor, and will the right of the state depend on the nature of the property
held in trust at the time of the decedent's death if decedent had power of
appointment or other power over trust?
Mr. Justice Jackson in the Aldrich case poses the question whether the
decision to tax tangible property will not now have to be overhauled!
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